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In his inﬂuential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence 
framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical 
necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of 
essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be meta-physically necessary is for it to be true 
in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical 
necessity in the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature 
of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical 
con-cepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine’s view crucially requires that certain apparent 
explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and accounted for, and I make a 
suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual
and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alter-native reductions, which remain 
nevertheless Finean in spirit.
1. Fine on Essence and Modality
There are two widespread accounts of what it is for an object to have a
property essentially, both framed in terms of the concept of metaphysi-
cal necessity. On one account, for an object to be essentially F is for it
to be metaphysically necessary that the object is F; and on the other
account, for an object to be essentially F is for it to be metaphysically
necessary that the object is F if it exists.
In his inﬂuential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’—which I, like many
others, take to be one of the most important papers on essentialism of
the last decades—Kit Fine objects to both accounts, on the grounds
that they do not leave room for certain plausible views about essential-
ist and modal matters of fact. Fine argues not only that these two
accounts are ﬂawed, but also that no satisfactory account framed in
terms of metaphysical modality can be found. He then advocates a
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reverse picture of the connection between essence and modality,
according to which it is metaphysical necessity which reduces to essence
rather than the other way around. According to Fine, each object or
plurality of objects gives rise to its own collection of metaphysically
necessary truths, the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature
of this or these objects—different objects or pluralities thereof typically
giving rise to different collections of such truths. On Fine’s reductive
account, for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be
true in virtue of the nature of all objects (p. 9).1
Fine’s ontology comprises concepts—logical concepts like, say, the
concept of conjunction, as well as non-logical concepts like, say, the
concept of bachelorhood. This allows him to propose a reduction of
conceptual and logical necessity2 also framed in terms of essence: to be
conceptually necessary is to be true in virtue of the nature of all con-
cepts, and to be logically necessary is to be true in virtue of the nature
of all logical concepts (pp.9–10).
Fine conceives of the notion of essence at work in the reductions to
be subject to the following principle of monotonicity: if a proposition
is true in virtue of the nature of some object or objects, then it is true
in virtue of the nature of any plurality of objects which comprises this
object or these objects. Given the Finean reductions, an immediate con-
sequence is that logical necessity is at least as strong as conceptual
necessity, which in turn is at least as strong as metaphysical neces-
sity—i.e. whatever is logically necessary is conceptually necessary, and
whatever is conceptually necessary is metaphysically necessary. This, I
take it, is just as it should be.3
The resulting picture is particularly attractive: three important modal
notions are analyzed in terms of a single notion, and the analyses
predict the correct order of relative strength between these notions.
But how are we to understand the relevant notion of essence? Fine
advocates a broadly Aristotelian conception of essence as a form of
deﬁnition, which he describes thus:
1 Unless explicitly mentioned, all page numbers make reference to ‘‘Essence and
Modality’’.
2 Throughout this paper, ‘conceptual necessity’ and ‘logical necessity’ will be under-
stood in such a way that contingent a priori propositions, if such there be, count as
neither conceptually nor logically necessary.
3 Say that a type of necessity is stronger than another one iﬀ the former is at least as
strong as the latter, but not vice versa. Although this is not absolutely uncontrover-
sial, most plausibly logical necessity is stronger than conceptual necessity (because
propositions like, say, the proposition that no bachelor is married, are conceptually,
but not logically, necessary), which in turn is stronger than metaphysical necessity
(because propositions like, say, the proposition that Socrates is human if he exists
are metaphysically, but not conceptually, necessary).
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[...] essence [h]as been conceived on the model of deﬁnition. It
has been supposed that the notion of deﬁnition has application
to both words and objects—that just as we may deﬁne a word,
or say what it means, so we may deﬁne an object, or say what
it is. The concept of essence has then [been] taken to reside in
the ‘‘real’’ or objectual cases of deﬁnition, as opposed to the
‘‘nominal’’ or verbal cases (p.2).
Yet he does not take that conception to be a reductive one:
[...] the traditional assimilation of essence to deﬁnition is better
suited to the task of explaining what essence is. It may not
provide us with an analysis of the concept, but it does provide
us with a good model of how the concept works (p.3).
For Fine, the concept of essence cannot be understood in fundamen-
tally different terms.
2. A Task: Accounting for Derivative Essentiality
Many will reject the idea of objectual deﬁnition as crazy, and many will
hold that the notion of essence is too obscure to be taken as a primi-
tive. I am on neither side. Be it as it may, it is an assumption of this
paper that Fine’s view of essence as primitive and to be conceived on
the model of deﬁnition is viable. Yet the Finean view about essence
and its relationships with modality needs to be somewhat further elabo-
rated in order to have any chance of being convincing. My main aim
in what follows is to supplement the Finean story in an appropriate
way. My goal is thus to complete, from a Finean perspective, the
Finean view at a point where I see what I take to be a lacuna.4
The lacuna concerns certain facts about ‘‘collective essences’’ I take
the Finean to be committed to. Fine’s reductions are framed in terms
of the predicate ‘... is true in virtue of the nature of —’, which takes
an expression designating a proposition and an expression designating
one object (e.g. ‘Socrates’, ‘the number 2’, ‘the concept of material
4 I should perhaps emphasize that it is not my aim to defend a Finean conception of
essence and modality. I actually believe that there are plausible replies to Fine’s
objections to the modal accounts of essence, and also, pace Fine, that cases can be
made for views to the eﬀect that the concept of essence can be understood in other
terms, in particular for views according to which essence reduces to modality. (See
e.g. Gorman 2005, Zalta 2006 and Correia 2007 for some recent anti-Finean
positions.) In my opinion, though, a proper assessment of the relative merits of the
various views in the area requires further clariﬁcatory work. The present paper is to
be seen as a work of that type on the Finean position.
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implication’) or several objects (e.g. ‘Socrates and Plato’, ‘the natural
numbers’, ‘the concept of material implication and the concept of bach-
elorhood’), in that order, to make a sentence.5 Now one important
thing to notice is that the Finean is committed to the view that some
correct collective essentialist attributions are irreducibly collective, i.e.
to the view that some statements of type ‘a is true in virtue of the nat-
ure of X’, where ‘X’ is a plural term, are true, without there being a
true statement of type ‘a is true in virtue of the nature of x’, where ‘x’
is a singular term.6
For take e.g. the following two propositions:
(1) <Socrates is distinct from the Eiffel Tower if both exist>
(2) <(Socrates is human if he exists) and (the Eiffel Tower is a
non-living, concrete thing if it exists)>
and assume that both are metaphysically necessary (many other exam-
ples of propositions involving several objects, in particular many logi-
cally complex propositions, could be invoked). By the Finean
reduction, there should be one object, or several objects, which is, or
are, an essentialist source of the truth of (1)—and similarly for (2).
Which object or objects could that be? Consider (1) ﬁrst. It is most nat-
ural to reject the view that (1) is true in virtue of the nature of Socra-
tes, on the grounds that, as Fine puts it, ‘‘there is nothing in [Socrates’]
nature which connects him in any special way to [the Eiffel Tower]’’ (p.
5). The view that the proposition is true in virtue of the nature of the
tower is also most naturally rejected, for a symmetrical reason. And it
is hard to see which other object could do the job. The natural thing to
say is that the proposition is true in virtue of the nature of Socrates
and the Eiffel Tower (and perhaps the concept of distinctness) taken
together. The very same kind of considerations applies to proposition
(2), and we are naturally led to the view that (2) is true in virtue of the
5 Fine 1995a (and also Fine 2000) suggests another grammar for essentialist state-
ments of the sort under consideration: there they are formulated by means of the
operator ‘it is true in virtue of the nature of ... that —’, which takes a predicate
(picking out the subjects of essentialist attribution) and a sentence to make a
sentence. Here I prefer to assume that the essentialist predicate provides the ‘‘canoni-
cal’’ way of making essentialist statements, and likewise that the various sorts of
necessities which will occupy us are canonically expressed by predicates on proposi-
tions rather than by the standard sentential operators. This is just for reasons of
convenience, however, and nothing serious will hinge on that choice.
6 Granted the deﬁnitional approach to essence, irreducibly collective essentialist truths
constitute, to use Fine’s words, ‘‘the objectual counterpart of simultaneous deﬁni-
tion’’ (Fine 1995a, p.242).
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nature of Socrates and the Eiﬀel Tower (and perhaps the concept of
conjunction) taken together.
Now there may be cases where it can be claimed, with some plausi-
bility, that the fact that a certain proposition is true in virtue of the
nature of several things is brute or basic, i.e. that it cannot be further
explained in essentialist terms. That (1) is true in virtue of the nature
of Socrates and the Eiﬀel Tower, or in virtue of the nature of another
given plurality of objects, is perhaps of that sort. But in many cases
such a claim is highly implausible. Take (2) for instance, and assume it
is true in virtue of the nature of Socrates, the Eiﬀel Tower and the con-
cept of conjunction. We cannot just assume that this fact is a brute
fact, in the sense that it cannot be explained in further essentialist
terms. For intuitively, the fact that (2) is true in virtue of the nature of
the three objects in question is derivative, i.e. it is to be explained in
terms of the individual nature of these objects, along something like
the following lines: it is because (i) <Socrates is human if he exists> is
true in virtue of the nature of Socrates, (ii) <the Eiﬀel Tower is a non-
living, concrete thing if it exists> is true in virtue of the nature of the
tower, and (iii) conjunction has the nature it has, that (2) is true in
virtue of the nature of the three objects taken together.
Thus my view is that once one endorses the Finean conception of
essence, one should admit the distinction between brute or basic and
derivative essentialist facts. By deﬁnition, the basic essentialist facts
cannot be explained in further essentialist terms, while the derivative
ones can. But how? How do the derivative essentialist facts derive from
other essentialist facts—ultimately, from the basic ones? We do not
have as yet an account of derivative essentiality which would enable us
to answer the question. This is the lacuna I previously alluded to.
Unless the Finean view is completed by such an account, the view will
remain incomplete, and, I take it, to a signiﬁcant extent unconvincing.
I will propose what I take to be an account of that sort in section 4.
But before that, I shall present and reject another, somewhat similar
account of derivative essentiality which very naturally comes to mind.7
3. The Consequentialist Account
I will hereafter follow previous usage and use ‘a’ as a singular term for
a proposition and ‘X’ as a plural term. For reasons of convenience, I
will follow the standard convention of using ‘plural term’ in a liberal
sense, so that a plural term may refer to several objects, but also to just
7 This account is discussed and rejected in Hale 1996, on the grounds that it leads to
a vicious regress. I do not think there is the vicious regress Hale supposes there to
be, but it is not the place here to elaborate on the issue.
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one object, and I will often use ‘plurality’ in the corresponding liberal
sense, counting genuine pluralities as well as single objects as plurali-
ties. On this policy, ‘belongs to’ will have to be understood as ‘is identi-
cal with’ when ﬂanked by terms that refer to single objects. I shall say
that plurality X is part of plurality Y when all the objects which belong
to X belong to Y. Finally, I will use ‘... is basically essential to —’ as
expressing basic essentiality and ‘... is derivatively essential to —’ as
expressing derivative essentiality—i.e. in such a way that the truth of a
true statement of type ‘a is basically essential to X’ is a basic essential-
ist fact, and the truth of a true statement of type ‘a is derivatively
essential to X’ is a derivative essentialist fact.
The account of derivative essentiality I wish to present here con-
ceives of derivation in term of logical consequence. Let me use ‘J’ for
logical consequence. Where X is any plurality of objects, let the basic
nature of X—BðXÞ, for short—be the plurality of propositions a such
that for some Y which is part of X, a is basically essential to Y.8 The
proposal is the following:
(3) a is derivatively essential to X :” a does not belong to
BðXÞ and BðXÞ ‘ a.
That is to say, a is derivatively essential to X just in case a does not
belong to, but is a logical consequence of, the basic nature of X. Given
that a proposition is true in virtue of the nature of a plurality of objects
iﬀ it is either basically or derivatively essential to that plurality, (3)
yields an elegant and simple account of the Finean notion of essence:
(4) a is true in virtue of the nature of X : BðXÞ ‘ a,
i.e. a is true in virtue of the nature of X just in case a is a logical conse-
quence of the basic nature of X. The concept of essence so deﬁned is
what Fine calls a concept of ‘‘consequentialist’’ essence (1995b, § 3),
and I will accordingly qualify the proposed account of derivative essen-
tiality by the same adjective.
The consequentialist account has its virtues. Consider again proposi-
tion (2). Assume that <Socrates is human if he exists> is basically
essential to Socrates, and that <the Eiffel Tower is a non-living, con-
crete thing if it exists> is basically essential to the tower. Given that a
8 I here invoke pluralities of propositions instead of sets because of potential cardinal-
ity problems. As a result, the conception of logical consequence involved in the
sequel is slightly diﬀerent from the standard conception, according to which logical
consequence relates a proposition (or a truth-bearer of another kind) and a set of
propositions (or of truth-bearers of the corresponding other kind).
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conjunction is a logical consequence of its conjuncts, by the account (2)
is derivatively essential to Socrates and the Eiffel Tower taken together.
Yet, as I previously stressed, I take the proposed account to be inap-
propriate. In line with the Finean conception of metaphysical necessity
and essence, we want to say that metaphysical necessities are true in
virtue of the nature of pluralities of objects, and that different meta-
physical necessities may be true in virtue of the nature of different
pluralities. This holds for non-conceptual necessities as well as for
conceptual necessities, in particular for logical necessities. For instance,
on that conception, the proposition:
(5) <If Sam is a philosopher and Maria is a politician, then
Sam is a philosopher or Maria is a politician>
should turn out derivatively essential to, say, conjunction, disjunction
and implication, as opposed to derivatively essential to conjunction
alone, or negation and the concept of existential quantiﬁcation. Now
clearly, the consequentialist account cannot do justice to the Finean view.
For given that every logical necessity is a logical consequence of any plu-
rality of propositions whatsoever, it is a logical consequence of the basic
nature of any plurality of objects whatsoever, and, therefore, the account
entails that it is derivatively essential to any plurality of objects we want.
Thus, for instance, by the account, conjunction, disjunction and implica-
tion collectively constitute a derivative essentialist ground for proposition
(5), but the same is also true of e.g. negation and the concept of existen-
tial quantiﬁcation, or again of Sam and Mont-Blanc.
Another, less compelling objection is that the account renders the
Finean reduction of logical necessity circular. The thought here is that
logical consequence itself is to be understood in terms of logical neces-
sity: for a proposition to be a logical consequence of a plurality of
propositions is for it to be the case that as a matter of logical necessity,
if the latter propositions hold, then so does the former. The objection
is less compelling, because although the foregoing thought is widely
held it can be doubted. An alternative view which has some plausibility
is e.g. the view that it is logical necessity which must be understood in
terms of logical consequence. On a variant of this view, to be logically
necessary is to be a logical consequence of the empty set.9
At this point, one might be tempted to reject the Finean reduction
of logical necessity while keeping the rest of the Finean story. On that
9 Notice here that given that there is no empty plurality, the view is committed to a
(standard) conception of logical consequence as a relation between propositions and
sets of propositions, rather than between propositions and pluralities of proposi-
tions.
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view, conceptual and metaphysical necessity reduce to essence, but logical
necessity does not have its source in the nature of logical con-
cepts—nor in any other plurality, for that matter: it is an altogether
different kind of necessity. Yet given the nice uniﬁed picture provided
by the Finean reductions, I take it that going that way is a line of last
resort, to be taken only if no appropriate account of derivative neces-
sity can be found. As I argue in the next section, such an account is
available.
4. The Rule-Based Account
The alternative account of derivative essentiality I wish to propose—the
rule-based account, as I will call it—stems from a brief suggestion Fine
makes in ‘‘Senses of Essence’’ when discussing the limits of a conse-
quentialist conception of essence (Fine 1995b, pp. 57–58). This is the
suggestion that ultimately, the essence of a logical concept—in my
terms, what is basically essential to it—is given, not by certain proposi-
tions, but rather by certain rules of inference. On such a view, for
instance, it will be taken to be part of the nature of conjunction that
from a conjunctive proposition one can infer each of its conjuncts, and
part of the nature of disjunction that from a proposition one can infer
any disjunctive proposition having the former proposition as a disjunct.
I will not adopt Fine’s suggestion as it is, though. A problem with
the view is that logical concepts, being objects of their own (I am here
following Fine), plausibly have basic essential properties which have
nothing to do with their proper logical nature. For instance, the con-
cept of disjunction may plausibly be said to be basically essentially a
concept, or self-identical. It makes very good sense indeed to distin-
guish, amongst the basic essential features of the logical concepts, those
features from the properly logical features, be they thought to be prop-
ositional or inferential in character.
Instead of Fine’s suggestion, thus, I will assume that the properly
logical features basically essential to logical concepts are inferential in
character. On that assumption, it is possible to develop a theory of
‘‘relative’’ logical consequence, which in turn can be used to give an
account of derivative essentiality. The point of the remaining part of
this section is to show how such a theory can be built, and subse-
quently to propose such an account.
A theory of relative logical consequence of the sort to be presented
here presupposes that ‘the class of all logical concepts’ unambiguously
and determinately refers to a well delineated class of objects, and that
to each logical concept is associated some ﬁxed and well deﬁned collec-
tion of rules of inference which characterize its basic logical nature.
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These presuppositions are substantial and even controversial, but I will
just boldly accept them. Among those who endorse them, there is
potential disagreement about what to count as a logical concept, and
about which rules of inference properly characterize this or that previ-
ously recognized logical concept. It is not the place here to argue for
one view against other views on these matters. I will work with the
assumption that the logical concepts are those expressed by certain
classical ‘‘logical constants’’, namely (classical) negation, conjunction,
disjunction, material implication, universal quantiﬁcation and existen-
tial quantiﬁcation—call the set of all these concepts ‘L’—and that the
rules of inference associated with these concepts are the introduction
and elimination rules mentioned by some standard classical natural
deduction system.10 This is just for the sake of illustration, though, and
many other views on which logical concepts there are and on their
inferential nature could be used to start with.
Given any proposition a, plurality of propositions D, and set of logi-
cal concepts (i.e. subset of L) S, say that a is a logical consequence of
D relative to S—in symbols, DJSa—iﬀ there is a proof of a from D,
such that given any rule concerning a logical concept which appears in
that proof, that concept is a member of S.
A few remarks are in order. First, the following equivalence is taken
to hold:
(6) DJa iﬀ there is a set S of logical concepts such that DJS a.
On that account, logical consequence simpliciter can accordingly be
deﬁned in terms of relative logical consequence. Second:
(7) If a belongs to D, then for every set of logical concepts
S,DJS a
(so that in particular, D ‘ a). There is indeed a proof of a from D using
only the rule of rewriting (also known as the rule of iteration) provided
that a belongs to D.11 Third, relative logical consequence is subject to a
monotonicity principle with respect to sets of logical concepts:
10 In standard natural deduction systems, the rules of inference concern sentential
expressions, and the notion of a proof is that of a proof of a sentential expression
from a collection of sentential expressions. I am here talking about rules of infer-
ence which concern propositions, and the notion of proof I will invoke below is
accordingly that of a proof of a proposition from a plurality of propositions.
11 The rule of rewriting is a ‘‘structural’’ rule, which enters into the deﬁnition of a cer-
tain sort of proofs and which accordingly does not characterize any of the members
of L.
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(8) If S is a subset of S¢ and DJS a, then DJS¢ a.12
Notice that (6) and (8) together entail:
(9) DJa iﬀ D ‘L a.
Fourth, relative logical consequence is subject to a monotonicity princi-
ple with respect to pluralities of propositions:
(10) If D is part of C and DJS a, then CJS a.13
Let me now turn to derivative essentiality. Where X is a plurality of
things, let logðXÞ be the (possibly empty) set of all logical concepts in
X. The rule-based account of derivative essentiality runs as follows:
(11) a is derivatively essential to X :” a does not belong to
BðXÞ and BðXÞ ‘logðXÞ a.
That is to say: a is derivatively essential to X just in case a does not
belong to the basic nature of X, but is a logical consequence, relative
to the set of all logical concepts in X, of the basic nature of X. The
proposed account of derivative essentiality yields an account of the
Finean notion of essence which is just slightly less simple than the con-
sequentialist account:
(12) a is true in virtue of the nature of X : BðXÞ ‘logðXÞ a,
i.e. a is true in virtue of the nature of X just in case a is a logical conse-
quence, relative to the logical concepts in X, of the basic nature of X.
Notice that despite the role played by relative logical consequence in
the account, (12) does not deﬁne concept of consequential essence
in the sense of Fine 1995b, § 3. For e.g. the propositions which are true
in virtue of the nature of Socrates are, on the proposed account, just
the propositions which belong to his basic nature. More generally, on
12 It is possible to deﬁne a corresponding ‘‘strict’’ notion which is not monotonic in
that sense, as follows:
a is a logical consequence of D strictly relative to S :” DJSa and "S¢ (if S¢ is a
proper subset of S, then D6 ‘S0 aÞ.
Such a strict notion, though, will not be needed.
13 It is possible to deﬁne a notion of relative logical consequence which is not mono-
tonic with respect to pluralities of propositions, as well as a notion which is mono-
tonic neither with respect to sets of logical concepts nor with respect to pluralities
of propositions, in the obvious way. But, again, such strict notions will not be
needed.
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the account, in case X comprises no logical concepts, the propositions
which are true in virtue of the nature of X are just those which belong
to the basic nature of X.
For certain pluralities of objects, the rule-based and the consequen-
tialist accounts are equivalent. In fact, (9) entails:
(13) If logðXÞ is L, then BðXÞ ‘logðXÞ a iff BðXÞ ‘ a.
As a corollary, granted the reduction of metaphysical necessity to
essence, on either account:
(14) a is metaphysically necessary iﬀ for some X, BðXÞ ‘ a.
The two accounts thus agree on what counts as metaphysically necessary.
Yet, clearly, the accounts are not equivalent for all pluralities. Any
proposition deemed derivatively essential to a given plurality by the
rule-based account must also be deemed so by the consequentialist
account (thanks to (6) above), but the converse does not hold. Counte-
rexamples to the converse are provided by pluralities comprising no
logical concepts (see above). Counterexamples involving pluralities
which do comprise logical concepts can also be proposed. For instance,
whereas on the rule-base account the proposition <if Sam is a philoso-
pher, then Sam is a philosopher> is not derivatively essential to con-
junction (since there is no proof of the proposition from the basic
nature of conjunction and the logical rules for conjunction), on the
consequential account that proposition is derivatively essential to any
plurality of objects whatsoever (because it is a logical consequence of
any plurality of propositions whatsoever), and hence in particular to
conjunction.
The superiority of the rule-based account over the consequentialist
account should be obvious. Every logical necessity is, on the conse-
quential account, derivatively essential to anything we want. Given that
account, whichever logically necessary truth we take, there is no way
we could possibly point to a plurality of logical concepts as collectively
constituting a derivative essentialist ground for that truth as opposed
to other pluralities. In contrast, the rule-based account is tailor-made
for taking care of logical necessities. This should already be evident,
but let me just illustrate the point with proposition (5), i.e. the proposi-
tion <if Sam is a philosopher and Maria is a politician, then Sam is a
philosopher or Maria is a politician>. There is a proof of that propo-
sition from no premises using only the elimination rule for conjunction,
the introduction rule for disjunction, and the introduction rule for
implication. The proposition is therefore a logical consequence, relative
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to the set of logical concepts f^;_;g, of any plurality of propositions
whatsoever, and so, in particular, of the basic nature of any plurality
of objects X such that logðXÞ ¼ f^;_;g. Consequently, on the
account, the proposition is derivatively essential to these logical con-
cepts. In contrast, on the rule-based account the proposition is not
derivatively essential to, say, Sam and Mont-Blanc (because there is no
proof of the proposition from the basic nature of Sam and Mont-Blanc
using no rule for logical concepts), or to the concepts of negation and
existential quantiﬁcation (because there is no proof of the proposition
from the basic nature of these two concepts using only inference rules
characterizing their basic logical natures).
5. Conceptual and Logical Necessity
In this ﬁnal section I wish to address certain issues concerning the con-
ceptual and the logical necessities. On Fine’s account, as we saw, con-
cepts are the essentialist grounds of the conceptual necessities, and
logical concepts the essentialist grounds of the logical necessities. As I
previously pointed out, Fine actually upholds stronger claims about
these types of necessity: he advocates a reduction of conceptual and
logical necessity to essence along the line of his reduction of metaphysi-
cal necessity, by invoking appropriate restrictions on the objects of
essentialist attribution. For a proposition to be conceptually necessary,
Fine holds, is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all concepts,
and for a proposition to be logically necessary is for it to be true in
virtue of the nature of all logical concepts (pp. 9–10).
Yet there are reasons, irrespective of the way the Finean notion of
essence is characterized, to doubt that the proposed reductive claims
are tenable. As I previously emphasized, logical concepts plausibly have
properties such as being a concept or being self-identical essentially.
Yet we do not want to say e.g. that the proposition <disjunction is a
concept>, although true in virtue of the nature of disjunction, is a log-
ical necessity. All the same, non-logical concepts equally plausibly have
such properties essentially, but it is very implausible to say e.g. that the
proposition <bachelorhood is a concept> is conceptually necessary.14
At best, the logical necessities should be taken to be a proper subclass
of what is true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts, and the
14 It may be held that the sentence ‘bachelorhood is a concept’ is analytic, on the
grounds that ‘bachelorhood’ has a descriptive content which marks the concept as
a concept, and accordingly one may be tempted to deem the proposition <bache-
lorhood is a concept> conceptually necessary. If the reader is inclined to go that
way, I suggest that she understand my claim as being about the proposition <b is
a concept>, where ‘b’ is a name stipulatively introduced as directly referring to the
concept of bachelorhood. Similar considerations apply to the case of disjunction.
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conceptual necessities a proper subclass of what is true in virtue of the
nature of all concepts.
The same kind of considerations apply to ‘‘local’’ notions of logical
and conceptual necessity. The Finean wants to say e.g. that the propo-
sition <if Sam is a philosopher and Maria is a politician, then Sam is
a philosopher or Maria is a politician> is logically necessary ‘‘in’’, say,
the concepts of conjunction, disjunction and implication, as opposed to
the concepts of negation and existential quantiﬁcation, and similarly,
that the proposition <no bachelor is married> is conceptually neces-
sary ‘‘in’’ the concept of bachelorhood but not, say, ‘‘in’’ the concept
of being married, or ‘‘in’’ the concepts of being a mountain and of
being a prime number. But, as the previous considerations show, we
cannot identify local logical or conceptual necessity with truth in virtue
of the nature of the corresponding concepts.
However, following the approach which underlies the rule-based
account of derivative essentiality, it is possible to characterize local log-
ical necessity, and logical necessity tout court, in a way which looks
promising. The account I have in mind invokes a notion of relative
theoremhood, which is akin to the notion of relative logical consequence
as previously deﬁned. Given any proposition a and set of logical con-
cepts S, say that a is a theorem relative to S—in symbols, JS a—iﬀ
there is a proof of a from no premises, such that given any rule con-
cerning a logical concept which appears in that proof, that concept is a
member of S. Relative theoremhood has the following properties:
(15) a is a theorem (simpliciter) iﬀ there is a set S of logical
concepts such that JS a
(16) If S is a subset of S¢ and JS a, then JS¢ a
(17) If JS a, then DJS a.
The suggestion is then simply to identify local logical necessity with rel-
ative theoremhood (for a proposition to be logically necessary in the
members of S is for it to be a theorem relative to S), and logical neces-
sity tout court as logical necessity in all the logical concepts taken
together. Given that (15) and (16) together entail:
(18) a is a theorem iﬀ ‘L a,
on that account the logical necessities are just the theorems simpliciter.
On the proposed picture, thus, the propositions which are true in
virtue of the nature of a given plurality X of logical concepts—i.e.,
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according to the rule-based account, the propositions which are conse-
quences, relative to the set S of all logical concepts in X, of the basic
nature of X—divide into two mutually exclusive classes. There is the
class constituted by the properly logical necessities—which on the pro-
posed account are the theorems relative to S. As it were, these proposi-
tions are true in virtue of the nature of X solely thanks to the
inferential nature of the logical concepts which belong to X, the (prop-
ositional) basic nature nature of X plays no role in giving them this
status. The second class, in contrast, is constituted by propositions
which at least partly owe their status to the basic nature of X, like,
e.g., the proposition <disjunction is a concept>.
The case of conceptual necessity can be treated in a similar way.
Take a given plurality of concepts X. If X comprises only logical con-
cepts, the conceptual necessities in X are just the theorems relative to
X. In case X comprises at least one non-logical concept, let Y be the
plurality of the concepts of that sort which belongs to X. We distin-
guish, within the basic nature of Y, those truths which are properly
conceptual (e.g. the proposition <no bachelor is married>) from those
which are not (e.g. the proposition <bachelorhood is a concept>).
The conceptual necessities in X are then identiﬁed with the logical con-
sequences, relative to the set of all the logical concepts in X, of the
‘‘conceptual part’’ of the basic nature of Y. And the conceptual necessi-
ties tout court are taken to be the propositions which are conceptually
necessary in the plurality of all concepts.
The propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of a given
plurality X of concepts thus divide into two mutually exclusive classes.
There is the class constituted by the properly conceptual necessities. By
the previous account, these propositions are true in virtue of the nature
of X solely thanks to the inferential nature of the logical concepts which
belongs to X (if any) and the ‘‘conceptual part’’ of the basic nature of
the non-logical concepts in X (if any). The second class, in contrast, is
constituted by propositions which at least partly owe their status either
to the basic nature of some logical concepts in X (if any) or to the
‘‘non-conceptual’’ basic nature of some logical concepts in X (if any).
The proposed account of the relationships between essence and
metaphysical, conceptual and logical necessity can be summed up as
follows. A proposition which is true in virtue of the nature of all
things, i.e. which is metaphysically necessary, is either true in virtue
of the nature of all concepts (1), or it is not (2). If it is, then either
it is true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts (1.1), or it is
not (1.2). If 1.1 holds, then either the proposition is properly con-
ceptual (1.1.1), or it is not (1.1.2). And likewise, if 1.2 holds, then
either the proposition is properly conceptual (1.2.1), or it is not
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(1.2.2). Plausible examples of each ultimate category are the follow-
ing:
[2:] <Socrates is human if existing>
[1.1.1:] <If Sam is a philosopher and Maria is a politician, then
Sam is a philosopher or Maria is a politician>
[1.1.2:] <Disjunction is a concept>
[1.2.1:] <No bachelor is married>
[1.2.2:] <Bachelorhood is a concept>.
The propositions which meet condition 1.1.1 or condition 1.2.1 are the
conceptual necessities; those which meet condition 1.1.1 are the logical
necessities, and those which meet condition 1.2.1 are the conceptual
necessities which are not logical necessities.15
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